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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JEFFERY RAY CHATWIN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20010060-CA 
Priority No. 2 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a conviction for Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court, 
State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding.1 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001), which grants this Court jurisdiction over appeals from convictions 
for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: Did the trial court err by allowing the prosecutor to perempt Mr. Amador Romero 
["Mr. Romero"], the only member of a racial minority on the venire, after the prosecutor 
1
 A copy of the Minutes of the "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment" is attached in 
Addendum A. 
explained that the sole reason for Mr. Romero's dismissal was his gender? 
Standard of Review: "The trial court's conclusion as to whether or not a prima facie 
case [of racial or sexual discrimination] was established is a legal determination which 
we review for correctness, according it no particular deference."2 Any "factual findings 
of the trial court relevant to allegedly discriminatory peremptory challenges merit 
deference on appeal and will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous." Pharos, 846 
P.2d at 459. Ultimately, the trial court's decision about whether purposeful 
discrimination was proved "turns on the credibility of the proponent of the strike and will 
not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous."3 
Preservation: This issue was preserved at R. 101 [25-28]. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The following provision from the United States Constitution is relevant on appeal. 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: 
. . . No State shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
2
 State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454,459 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). See also Batson v. Kentucky. 
476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (describing the legal standards for assessing a prima facie case); State v. 
Span. 819 P.2d 329, 340-42 (Utah 1991) (analyzing the legal cognizability of a minority group 
for purposes of assessing a prima facie case of racial discrimination). 
3
 State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996). See also State v. Bowman, 945 
P.2d 153, 155 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (The trial court's determination about whether purposeful 
racial discrimination has been proved "is a question of fact, [and] we will not reverse the 
decision of the trial court unless it is clearly erroneous.") 
2 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On 16 June 2000 Appellant Jeffery Ray Chatwin ["Mr. Chatwin"] was charged by 
information with one count of Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999). Mr. Chatwin entered a plea of not guilty, R. 21, and 
a trial date was set. R. 33. 
A venire was assembled on 21 November 2000.4 Following voir dire, the 
prosecutor and defense counsel exercised their peremptory strikes. R. 49,101 [23]. The 
prosecutor used one of his strikes to eliminate the only member of a minority group, Mr. 
Romero, from the venire. R. 49,101 [25-27]. Also, all four of the prosecutor's strikes 
were used to eliminate men. R. 49, 101 [27]. The defense counsel challenged the 
elimination of Mr. Romero, pointing out that he was the only member of a minority 
group on the venire. R. 101 [26]. The prosecutor replied that he was not required to 
proffer an explanation for the strike unless the court found a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination. Id 
The court found that the name "Romero" is a Hispanic surname, and that the 
defense counsel was entitled to an explanation for the strike. R. 101 [26-27]. The 
prosecutor stated the following: 
I felt, Your Honor, that this Jury would be better able to deliberate the 
4
 R. 101 [4-5]. The Jury List, R. 49-50, is included in Addendum B. 
3 
evidence that I anticipate presenting to it if it were balanced between men 
and women. I therefore made efforts to take men off of the Jury. That may 
not make a great deal of sense, but that was the game plan. Mr. Romero 
was a man, I took him because he was a man and I thought I would be more 
comfortable with Ms. Rayburn or Ms. Tapp on the Jury than Mr. Romero 
on the Jury. 
R. 101 [27]. In response, the defense counsel pointed out that the United States Supreme 
Court's holding in Batson v. Kentucky, prohibiting the use of peremptory strikes to 
eliminate venirepersons on the basis of their race, is extended to prohibit gender 
discrimination. R. 101 [28]. The defense counsel argued that removing venirepersons on 
the basis of either race or gender is inappropriate. Id. The trial court responded as 
follows: 
Well, I am not prepared to state that the [prosecutor's] challenge [of Mr. 
Romero] was inappropriate. It appears to me that there's been a justification 
for exercising the challenge against Mr. Romero. And moreover I'm not 
persuaded that in a case of this nature, specifically a spousal-abuse type of 
case, that selecting jurors, be they male or female which the Prosecutor or 
Defense for that matter decides might be more inclined to adhere to the 
Prosecution's theory of the case or the Defense's theory, for instance, that 
that was an inappropriate way or manner or justification for a challenge; 
therefore, your challenge is declined.5 
Mr. Chatwin was convicted by the jury as charged. R. 41-42. He filed a timely 
Notice of Appeal. R. 85-86. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Based upon incidents of domestic violence, Judge Sheila McCleve issued a 
5
 Id The transcript of the defense counsel's objection, the prosecutor's explanation, and 
the trial court's rulings, R. 101 [25-29], is included in Addendum C. 
4 
protective order against Ms. Brenda Lee ["Ms. Lee"], ordering her to attend counseling 
and anger management classes and to stay away from Mr. Chatwin. R. 101 [55-56]. In 
violation of that order, Ms. Lee was living with Mr. Chatwin, his mother, and his five 
daughters at 1325 Indiana Avenue. R. 101 [37]. 
On 13 June 2000 Ms. Lee was intoxicated. R. 101 [52]. She had been drinking and 
using methamphetamine. R. 101 [39-40, 52-53]. She drove from Mr. Chatwin's house to 
her friend "Doug's" house, using Mr. Chatwin's vehicle. Id. She then returned to Mr. 
Chatwin's house. R. 101 [40]. She and Mr. Chatwin, who had drunk some beers that day, 
began arguing because Ms. Lee had missed a Drug Court meeting which she had been 
ordered to attend. R. 101 [40-41, 54-55]. Ms. Lee decided to leave and go to her mother's 
house. R. 101 [41]. She began walking west on Indiana Avenue. Id 
Ms. Lee testified that Mr. Chatwin was "hollering and screaming" at her as she 
walked. R. 101 [43], However, a juvenile witness indicated that Mr. Chatwin "just 
standed there." R. 101 [63]. Besides being intoxicated, Ms. Lee had not slept for at least a 
day due to her methamphetamine use. R. 101 [52-54]. 
About that time, Ms. Lee's 14-year old daughter, Alicia Ann Lee ["Alicia"], 
telephoned Mr. Chatwin's home because she hadn't spoken to her mother in several days 
and wanted to see how her mother was doing.6 Mr. Chatwin answered the telephone. R. 
101 [104]. He told Alicia that her mother was outside, and that she was taking her things 
and wanted to leave. Id Ms. Lee did not come to the telephone. R. 101 [101]. 
6
 R. 30,101 [99]. Alicia was not living with her mother at that time. R. 101 [100]. 
5 
Ms. Lee continued walking west on Indiana Avenue. She crossed Concord Street 
and Navajo Street, and reached a 7-Eleven. R. 101 [42-43]. Mr. Chatwin got in his truck 
and drove west, intending to find Ms. Lee to tell her about Alicia's call. R. 101 [43, 87]. 
He turned into the 7-Eleven and stopped in front of Ms. Lee. R. 101 [44]. He asked her to 
get in the truck. R. 101 [44]. She refused. R. 101 [45]. She turned, walked behind the 
truck, and started walking across the street. Id. A juvenile witness testified that Mr. 
Chatwin put the truck in reverse and hit Ms. Lee, throwing her several feet. The witness 
testified that Mr. Chatwin said, "that's what she gets." R. 101 [69]. Mr. Chatwin left the 
scene. R. 101 [71]. 
After Mr. Chatwin returned home, he called the police and reported that a drunk 
woman had bumped into his car at the 7-Eleven. R. 101 [80]. Alicia called again and Mr. 
Chatwin answered. R. 101 [104]. He told Alicia that her mother had bumped into the 
back of his truck and was at the 7-Eleven acting "like he hit her with the truck." Id. He 
also told Alicia "that he didn't know what he supposed to do" and had simply returned to 
the house. R. 101 [104]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The prosecutor's blatant admission that he "made efforts to take men off of the 
Jury," R. 101 [27], and that he dismissed Mr. Romero from the jury because Mr. Romero 
was a man, Id., violates the Equal Protection principle. In J.E.B. v. Alabama, the United 
6 
States Supreme Court extended the holding of Batson v. Kentucky7 to prohibit 
prosecutors from intentionally discriminating against potential jurors on the basis of their 
gender. J.E.B. v. Alabama. 511 U.S. 127,130-31 (1994). As the Court explained in 
JJEJL intentional discrimination on the basis of gender "serves to ratify and perpetuate 
invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and 
women." Id. This is particularly true in cases which involve gender-related issues, such 
as rape, sexual harassment, or paternity. IdL at 140. Courts across the country have been 
particularly diligent in ridding domestic violence cases from the taint of gender 
discrimination during jury selection.8 
This case involves an incident of domestic violence and the trial court should have 
been particularly diligent in ensuring that gender discrimination did not taint jury 
selection. Instead, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to dismiss Mr. Romero on the 
basis that the prosecutor's "game plan" was to remove men from the jury and Mr. 
Romero was dismissed pursuant to this plan. R. 101 [27]. The trial court also ruled that 
racial discrimination had not occurred and that gender discrimination during a "spousal-
abuse type case" was not inappropriate. R. 101 [28]. 
7
 In Batson v. Kentucky the United States Supreme Court held that prosecutors may not 
intentionally discriminate against potential jurors on the basis of their race. Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 69, 89 (1986). 
8
 Maddox v. State, 708 So.2d 220, 228 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Bourgeois. 786 
So.2d 771, 775 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Commonwealth v. Tourscher. 682 A.2d 1275, 1280 (Pa. 
1996); State v. Turner. 879 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Donaghv. 769 A.2d 10,14-
15 (Vt. 2000); Pavne v. Gundy. 468 S.E.2d 335, 340, 343 (W. Va. 1996). 
7 
This ruling defies the holding of the United States Supreme Court in J.E.B. v. 
Alabama, and ignores the recognition of the Utah Supreme Court and this Court that 
gender discrimination is unconstitutional. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f23 n.9, 12 
P.3d 92; State v. ColwelL 2000 UT 8,114,994 P.2d 177; State v. Shepherd. 1999 UT 
App 305, TJ28, 989 P.2d 503. It also sets a dangerous precedent that would allow 
prosecutors to unabashedly discriminate on the basis of gender simply by asserting that 
members of one gender are more likely to be sympathetic and receptive to prosecutorial 
arguments. This sort of stereotyping is at the root of the social injustice condemned by 
the United States Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 97-99 and J.E.B. v. 
Alabama, 511 U.S. at 131-34. As the Court said in J.E.B.. "[s]triking individual jurors on 
the assumption that they hold particular views simply because of their gender is 
'practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority.'" IcL 
at 142 (citations omitted). The trial court's unconstitutional precedent should be 
condemned by this Court, and Mr. Chatwin should receive a new trial untainted by 
governmentally-approved racial or sexual discrimination. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE PROSECUTOR 
TO STRIKE THE ONLY MINORITY VENIREPERSON AFTER 
THE PROSECUTOR EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS DOING SO ON 
THE BASIS OF THE VENIREPERSON'S GENDER 
The principal of Equal Protection prohibits the prosecutor from using even one 
8 
peremptory challenge to discriminate against a venireperson on the basis of race or 
gender. Yet, in this case the prosecutor boldly declared, "Mr. Romero was a man, I took 
him [off] because he was a man and I thought I would be more comfortable with Ms. 
Rayburn or Ms. Tapp on the Jury than Mr. Romero on the Jury." R. 101 [27]. The trial 
court, seemingly reassured that no unconstitutional activity was taking place, permitted 
the strike, ruling that there was nothing inappropriate about gender discrimination in a 
"spousal-abuse type of case . . . . " R. 101 [28]. This blatantly ignores well-established 
jurisprudence flatly prohibiting race or gender-based discrimination injury selection, and 
condones gender discrimination in precisely the circumstances where it may do the most 
harm. 
Beginning with Batson v. Kentucky issued in 1986, the United States Supreme 
Court has worked to ensure that the jury selection process proceeds unhindered by the 
evils of social discrimination that undermined the fabric of our society in the past. In 
Batson the Court declared that "the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to 
challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black 
jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black 
defendant." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). This protection was readily 
extended to members of all cognizable racial minority groups in Holland v. Illinois. 493 
U.S. 474,476-77 (1990). 
In J.E.B. v. Alabama, the Court examined the issue of gender discrimination in the 
jury selection process. In J.E.B. the State of Alabama filed a paternity suit against a man 
9 
on behalf of a mother and her minor child. J.E.B. v. Alabama. 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994). 
The venire consisted of thirty-six people, twelve men and twenty-four women. Id The 
State used nine of its ten peremptory strikes to remove men and the defendant used all 
but one of his strikes to remove women. Id. The resulting jury consisted entirely of 
women. Id. The defendant was found to be the father of the child and was ordered to pay 
child support. Id He appealed, claiming that the prosecutor unconstitutionally 
discriminated against men in exercising his peremptory challenges. Id. at 129-30. 
The United States Supreme Court agreed. The Court declared: 
[t]oday we reaffirm what, by now, should be axiomatic: Intentional 
discrimination on the basis of gender by state actors violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, particularly where, as here, the discrimination serves to 
ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about 
the relative abilities of men and women. 
Id. at 130-31. Attempting to justify the strikes, the State drew the Court's attention to the 
fact that the case involved a paternity action filed on behalf of a child born out of 
wedlock. Id. at 137-38. The State argued that it was reasonable to strike virtually all of 
the men from the jury because, historically, male jurors had been disposed to accept the 
arguments of a man while female jurors were disposed to accept the arguments of the 
mother. Id The Court flatly rejected this argument, declaring, "[w]e shall not accept as a 
defense to gender-based peremptory challenges 'the very stereotype the law condemns.'" 
Id at 138 (citation omitted). The Court emphasized: 
When state actors exercise peremptory challenges in reliance on gender 
stereotypes, they ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of the relative 
abilities of men and women. Because these stereotypes have wreaked 
10 
injustice in so many other spheres of our country's public life, active 
discrimination by litigants on the basis of gender during jury selection 
invites cynicism respecting the jury's neutrality and its obligation to 
adhere to the law.' . . . The potential for cynicism is particularly acute in 
cases where gender-related issues are prominent, such as cases involving 
rape, sexual harassment, or paternity. Discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges may create the impression that the judicial system has 
acquiesced in suppressing full participation by one gender or that the 'deck 
has been stacked' in favor of one side.9 
Addressing concern that its holding would severely cripple the important role of 
peremptory challenges in impaneling fair, impartial juries, the Court added that its 
holding "does not imply the elimination of all peremptory challenges." IdL at 143. On the 
contrary, "[p]arties still may remove jurors who they feel might be less acceptable than 
others on the panel; gender simply may not serve as a proxy for bias." Id. "Even strikes 
based on characteristics that are disproportionately associated with one gender could be 
appropriate, absent a showing of pretext." Id. To avoid pretextual strikes, trial courts 
9
 IcL at 140 (emphasis added) (quoting Powers v. Ohio. 499 U.S. 400,412-13 (1991)). 
Significantly, the Court also noted: 
Even if a measure of truth can be found in some of the gender stereotypes used to 
justify gender-based peremptory challenges, that fact alone cannot support 
discrimination on the basis of gender injury selection. We have made abundantly 
clear in past cases that gender classifications that rest on impermissible 
stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when some statistical 
support can be conjured up for the generalization The generalization 
advanced by Alabama in support of its asserted right to discriminate on the basis 
of gender is, at the least, overbroad, and serves only to perpetuate the same 
'outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women.' . . . The Equal 
Protection Clause, as interpreted by decisions of this Court, acknowledges that a 
shred of truth may be contained in some stereotypes, but requires that state actors 
look beyond the surface before making judgments about people that are likely to 
stigmatize as well as to perpetuate historical patterns of discrimination. 
Id at 139 n.l 1 (citations deleted). 
11 
should conduct a thorough voir dire so that parties will have a firm basis upon which to 
exercise their peremptory strikes. Id. at 143-44. "If conducted properly, voir dire can 
inform litigants about potential jurors, making reliance upon stereotypical and pejorative 
notions about a particular gender or race both unnecessary and unwise." Id at 143. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently recognized that J.E.B. v. Alabama prohibits 
Utah prosecutors from purposefully discriminating against venirepersons on the basis of 
their gender. State v. Litherland. 2000 UT 76,1J23 n.9, 12 P.3d 92; State v. Colwell. 2000 
UT 8, fl4, 994 P.2d 177. Likewise, this Court holds that striking potential jurors solely 
on the basis of their gender violates the principal of Equal Protection. State v. Shepherd. 
1999 UT App 305, ^ 28, 989 P.2d 503. 
As a result of J.E.B.. courts across the country are particularly diligent in 
scrutinizing jury selection proceedings when cases involve domestic violence, rape, 
sexual harassment, and other gender-sensitive issues.10 Recently, appellate courts have 
reversed or remanded many cases involving domestic violence because prosecutors have 
blatantly discriminated against venirepersons on the basis of gender." Even when gender 
See J.E.B.. 511 U.S. at 140 ("The potential for cynicism is particularly acute in cases 
where gender-related issues are prominent, such as cases involving rape, sexual harassment, or 
paternity. Discriminatory use of peremptory challenges may create the impression that the 
judicial system has acquiesced in suppressing full participation by one gender or that the 'deck 
has been stacked' in favor of one side.") 
11
 Maddox v. State. 708 So.2d 220, 228 (Ala.Ct. App. 1997); State v. Bourgeois. 786 S.2d 
771, 775 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Commonwealth v. Tourscher. 682 A.2d 1275,1280 (Pa. 1996); 
State v. Turner. 879 S.W.2d 819,821 (Term. 1994). 
12 
discrimination is merely implied, courts have reversed or remanded for Batson hearings.12 
In such cases, a showing of harmfulness is not required because gender or race-
based discrimination is a structural error that affects the entire trial from beginning to 
end. State v. Russell 917 P.2d 557, 560 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). This is consistent with 
Batson v. Kentucky, which indicated that a showing of purposeful racial discrimination, 
unrebutted by a race-neutral explanation, requires the reversal of the defendant's 
conviction.13 In this case, the prosecutor removed Mr. Romero from the jury on the basis 
of his gender and race, and Mr. Chatwin's conviction should be reversed and this case 
remanded for a new trial. 
A. As the Trial Court Ruled. There is a Prima Facie Case of Racial 
Discrimination Because Mr. Romero was the Only Member of a Racial 
Minority Group on the Venire. He Spoke with an Accent and There was no 
Indication that He was an Incompetent or Undesirable Juror 
The United States Supreme Court indicates that when a peremptory strike is 
challenged as a pretext for racial or sexual discrimination, a three-part test applies. J.E.EL 
511 U.S. at 144-45; Batson. 476 U.S. at 96-99. First, a defendant who is alleging 
discrimination must proffer a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination. J.E.B.. 
12
 People v. Gandv. 878 P.2d 68, 70 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Donaghv. 769 A.2d 
10,14-16 (Vt. 2000); Pavne v. Gundv. 468 S.E.2d 335, 340, 343 (W. Va. 1996). 
13
 Batson, 476 U.S. at 100. See also State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454,459 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (Parties stipulation that a showing of harm is not required where purposeful discrimination 
is shown is "consistent with the directive in Batson that if a court finds unrebutted, purposeful 
discrimination, 'precedents require that [a] petitioner's conviction be reversed."') 
13 
511 U.S. at 144-45. "In Utah, the elements necessary to establish a prima facie case 
include: '(1) as complete a record as possible, (2) a showing that persons excluded belong 
to a cognizable group . . . and (3) a showing that there exists 4a strong likelihood that 
such persons are being challenged because of their group association rather than because 
of any specific bias.'5"14 
Once a prima facie showing has been proffered, "[t]he burden then shifts to the 
challenged party to show the existence of a [race or gender] neutral reason for the 
challenge." State v. Cantu. 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989). If the prosecutor's 
explanation is race neutral and gender neutral, the trial court must proceed to determine 
whether purposeful racial or sexual discrimination has tainted the jury selection process. 
Pharris, 846 P.2d at 464. If the prosecutor's explanation is discriminatory on its face, the 
challenged peremptory strike violates the Equal Protection principal and the trial court 
must disallow the strike as a matter of law.15 
14
 Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305,1J29, 989 P.2d 503 (quoting State v. Alvarez. 872 P.2d 
450,456 (Utah 1994)). 
15
 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 ("The prosecutor therefore must articulate a neutral 
explanation related to the particular case to be tried. The trial court then will have the duty to 
determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.") (emphasis added); State 
v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153,155-56 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (Once a race neutral explanation is 
proffered, the trial court must determine whether the explanation is a pretext for racial 
discrimination. This determination rests on the credibility of the proponent of the strike, and this 
Court "will not reverse the decision of the trial court unless it is clearly erroneous."); State v. 
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996) (Because the final step requires the trial court to 
evaluate the credibility of the proponent of the strike, who has already proffered a race neutral 
explanation, the court's determination "will not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous."); 
State v. Merrill 928 P.2d 401,403 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("'[U]nless a discriminatory intent is 
inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.'... 
[When the explanation is race neutral] the inquiry, as to whether Batson was violated, proceeds 
14 
In this case, the first part of the test is met. As the trial court ruled, there is a prima 
facie case of racial discrimination. R. 101 [27]. The prosecutor used his fourth 
peremptory challenge to dismiss Mr. Romero. R. 49. Mr. Romero spoke with an accent, 
R. 101 [28], and the trial court noted that Mr. Romero had a Hispanic surname. R. 101 
[27]. Both the defense counsel and prosecutor acknowledged that Mr. Romero was a 
minority venireperson. R. 101 [26-27]. In fact, as the defense counsel pointed out, Mr. 
Romero was the only member of a racial minority group on the venire. R. 101 [26]. 
Further, there was no apparent reason for Mr. Romero's dismissal. During voir dire, he 
stated his name, indicated that he worked for Associated Food stores, and explained that 
his wife worked for Sky West. R. 101 [7]. He said nothing during the rest of voir dire, R. 
101 [11-24], and there was nothing to indicate that he was an incompetent or undesirable 
juror from the prosecutor's point of view. In these circumstances, the trial court correctly 
found that there was a prima facie showing of racial discrimination. R. 101 [27]. 
The defense counsel did not have an opportunity to proffer a prima facie case of 
sexual discrimination because that issue did not arise until the prosecutor gave an 
explanation which was sexually discriminatory on its face. R. 101 [27]. The trial court 
then ruled on both issues of discrimination. R. 101 [28]. At this point, the issue of 
whether there was a prima facie case of sexual discrimination is moot. Once a prosecutor 
tenders his explanation and the trial court rules on the ultimate question of purposeful 
to step three.") (citations omitted). 
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discrimination, the preliminary issue of a prima facie showing is irrelevant.16 
At any rate, there was a prima facie case of sexual discrimination here. The venire 
consisted of thirty people, nineteen men and eleven women. R. 49-50. The first seventeen 
names on the list included ten men and seven women.17 The prosecutor used 100 percent 
of his strikes to eliminate men. Four men were struck by the prosecutor, three men and 
one woman were struck by the defense counsel, and one woman was excused by the 
16
 Hernandez v. New York. 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991). See also Drane v. State. 523 
S.E.2d 301, 303 n.3 (Ga. 1999) ("The trial court made no finding as to prima facie 
discrimination, but this preliminary finding is moot once the proponent gives reasons for its 
strikes and the trial court makes its findings."); People v. Rivera, 719 N.E.2d 154, 162 (111. Ct. 
App. 1999) ("[T]he preliminary issue of whether the defendant has made a prima facie case 
becomes moot where the trial court fails to determine whether such a showing has been made, 
the State voluntarily offers reasons for its challenges, and the trial court rules on the ultimate 
question of purposeful racial discrimination."); State v. Edwards, 955 P.2d 1276, 1288 (Kan. 
1998) ("[0]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges 
and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the 
preliminary issue of whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing becomes moot."); 
Collins v. State. 691 So.2d 918, 926 n.3 (Miss. 1997) ("Once a prosecutor has offered a race-
neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate 
question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made 
a prima facie showing becomes moot."); Fritz v. State. 946 S.W.2d 844, 850 n.2 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1997) ("Once the responding party has offered a neutral explanation for the peremptory 
challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of purposeful discrimination, the 
preliminary issue of whether the objecting party had made a prima facie showing becomes 
moot."); Colwell 2000 UT 8, fl8 (the requirement of a prima facie showing is waived when the 
prosecutor fails to contest the sufficiency of the showing and proffers an explanation); Bowman, 
945 P.2d at 155 n.2 ("The prosecutor waived the issue of whether a prima facie case of 
discrimination was established by failing to raise it in the trial court and providing an 
explanation for his use of the challenged peremptory strikes."); State v. King, 572 N.W.2d 530, 
533 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) ("When the prosecutor offers a race-neutral explanation for 
peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional 
discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant made a prima facie showing 
becomes moot."). 
17
 R. 49. Only the first seventeen venirepersons were necessarily evaluated by counsel for 
each side because eight jurors were to be impaneled, eight would be dismissed through 
peremptory strikes, and one was excused by the court. R. 49. 
16 
court. R. 49-50. Ultimately, the jury consisted of five women and only three men. R. 49. 
By using his strikes to systematically eliminate men, the prosecutor reduced the 
percentage of men from sixty-three percent on the venire to thirty-eight percent on the 
jury.18 Further, the alleged victim in this case was a women and the defendant was a man. 
These facts alone provides a strong indication of gender discrimination.19 Additionally, 
the fact that this was a domestic violence case should have triggered careful 
scrutinization of the jury selection process because this is precisely the type of case where 
"[t]he potential for cynicism is particularly acute."20 Thus, there was a prima facie case of 
18
 R. 49. The percentage of men making up the first seventeen names listed is fifty-nine 
percent. 
19
 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97 (pattern of striking members of cognizable racial group may 
give rise to inference of discrimination); Maddox, 708 So.2d at 224 (prima facie case established 
where prosecutor used nine of his eleven peremptory challenges to strike men); Gandy, 878 P.2d 
at 69 (prima facie case established where venire consisted of eleven men and fourteen women, 
and prosecutor used all six of his peremptory challenges to strike men); Bourgeois, 786 So.2d at 
776 (prima facie case established where prosecutor exhibited a pattern of striking men from the 
jury where "[n]o obvious reason for the strikes other than gender appear of record."); State v. 
Call 508 S.E.2d 496, 510 (N.C. 1998) (Factors to consider in evaluating whether a prima facie 
case has been established "include the gender of the defendant, the victim and any key 
witnesses; questions and comments made by the prosecutor during jury selection which tend to 
support or contradict an inference of gender discrimination; the frequent exercise of peremptory 
challenges to prospective jurors of one gender that tends to establish a pattern, or the use of a 
disproportionate number of peremptory challenges against venire members of one gender; 
whether the State exercised all of its peremptory challenges; and the ultimate gender makeup of 
the jury."); Pharris. 846 P.2d at 458 (this Court found a prima facie case of racial discrimination 
where prosecutor used three of his four peremptory challenges to strike Native Americans); 
Donaghy. 769 A.2d at 12 (prima facie case established where venire consisted often women and 
eleven men, and prosecutor used six strikes to eliminate men and one strike to eliminate a 
woman); Payne, 468 S.E.2d at 340 (prima facie case established where venire consisted of nine 
men and three women, and prosecutor used two of his three peremptory strikes to eliminate 
women). 
20
 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140. See also Donaghv. 769 A.2d at 14 ("Because this case involves 
the gender-related issue of domestic violence, we review it with a keen eye to preventing state-
17 
sexual discrimination here. 
B. Because the Prosecutor's Explanation for the Dismissal was 
Discriminatory on Its Face, the Trial Court Should Have Prohibited the 
Strike at that Point Rather than Allowing the Strike on the Basis that Sexual 
Discrimination is Acceptable in a "Spousal-abuse type case" 
The second part of the three-part test requires the prosecutor to come forward with 
a race and gender-neutral explanation for the dismissal. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 145. The 
explanation "need not rise to the level of a 'for cause' challenge; rather, it merely must be 
based on a juror characteristic other than gender [or race], and the proffered explanation 
may not be pretextual." J.E.B.. 511 U.S. at 145. Specifically, "a party may not rebut the 
prima facie case by either asserting that he or she believed that the challenged venireman 
would be partial to the defendant because of race [or gender] or by simply denying any 
lack of good faith in the challenged peremptory strikes."21 The explanation must be 
legitimate in that it is race neutral and gender neutral, it must be related to the case being 
tried, and it must be clear and reasonably specific. Cantu, 778 P.2d at 518. 
In this case, after being required to proffer an explanation for Mr. Romero's 
dismissal, the prosecutor responded: 
I felt, Your Honor, that this Jury would be better able to deliberate the 
sanctioned discrimination); Payne, 468 S.E. 2d at 343 ("inasmuch as this action involves a case 
of alleged domestic assault and battery, it comports with the admonition of J.E.B., set forth 
above, that the potential for cynicism in the face of gender discrimination in the jury selection 
process 'is particularly acute in cases . . . involving rape, sexual harassment, or paternity.'") 
21
 gharris, 846 P.2d at 463 (citing Batson. 476 U.S. at 98). 
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evidence that I anticipate presenting to it if it were balanced between men 
and women. I therefore made efforts to take men off of the Jury. That may 
not make a great deal of sense, but that was the game plan. Mr. Romero 
was a man, I took him because he was a man and I thought I would be more 
comfortable with Ms. Rayburn or Ms. Tapp on the Jury than Mr. Romero 
on the Jury. 
R. 101 [27]. The court then asked the prosecutor whether the strike had anything to do 
with Mr. Romero's Hispanic surname, and the prosecutor responded that it did not. Id. 
The defense counsel again objected, explaining that the United States Supreme Court's 
holding in Batson had been extended to prohibit gender discrimination. IdL at 28. The 
trial court then ruled as follows: 
Well, I am not prepared to state that the challenge was inappropriate. It 
appears to me that there's been a justification for exercising the challenge 
against Mr. Romero. And moreover I'm not persuaded that in a case of this 
nature, specifically a spousal-abuse type of case, that selecting jurors, be 
they male or female which the Prosecutor or Defense for that matter 
decides might be more inclined to adhere to the Prosecution's theory of the 
case or the Defense's theory, for instance, that that was an inappropriate 
way or manner or justification for a challenge; therefore, your challenge is 
declined. Let's bring the jury in. 
Id at 28-29. 
The prosecutor's explanation was discriminatory on its face, and the trial court's 
ruling was legal error. The prosecutor blatantly admitted that his general game plan was 
to remove men from the jury and he "made efforts to take men off of the jury." R. 101 
[27]. He also acknowledged that he removed Mr. Romero "because he was a man " 
Id. This is illegal. "We shall not accept as a defense to gender-based peremptory 
challenges 'the very stereotype the law condemns.'" J.E.EL 511 U.S. at 138 (citation 
19 
omitted). Thus, the trial court should have disallowed the peremptory challenge, and 
should not have proceeded to the third part of the three-part test. 
Blatant discrimination against venirepersons on the basis of gender, particularly 
where the case involves domestic violence, has not been tolerated in light of J.E.B. In 
Commonwealth v. Tourschen the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated a conviction 
for burglary, criminal trespass, recklessly endangering another person, simple assault, 
and terroristic threats because the prosecutor "blatantly stated that she struck six female 
venirepersons because 'from prosecuting domestic cases [she has found] that women are 
a lot tougher on domestic cases '" Tourscher. 682 A.2d at 1277,1280 (citation 
omitted). In a case of incest, the Louisiana Court of Appeals remanded for a Batson 
hearing because the prosecutor commented before the trial and during the impanelment 
that he was trying to keep men off the jury. Bourgeois. 786 So.2d at 775. 
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reversed a rape conviction because the 
prosecutor's explanation for removing a black woman from the jury was that "[t]here are 
some authorities who believe that the fewer the women that you have on a rape case, the 
.. as jurors, the better." Maddox. 708 So.2d at 228. In that case the Court commented, 
"[t]his appears to be exactly the sort of gender-based reason for exercising peremptory 
challenges condemned by the United States Supreme Court in J.E.B. v. Alabama " 
Id. Finally, in a case involving two counts of incest, the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
affirmed the trial court's ruling that the defense counsel could not use his peremptory 
strikes to eliminate women from the jury after he admitted that he was trying to empanel 
20 
an all-male jury. Turner. 879 S.W.2d at 821. 
Mere implications of gender discrimination have compelled appellate courts to 
reverse or remand for Batson hearings. The Supreme Court of Vermont remanded a case 
for a Batson hearing because the prosecutor used 85 percent of his strikes against men. 
Donaghy. 769 A.2d at 14-15. That Court noted that "[w]hen men appear to be 
systematically removed from juries selected by a prosecutor [charged with prosecuting 
violent crimes against women], there is a strong inference of gender discrimination." Id. 
at 15. The West Virginia Supreme Court reversed an assault and battery conviction 
because the prosecutor's explanation for using two of his three peremptory strikes to 
eliminate women was cursory and ambiguous and appeared to be a pretext for gender 
discrimination. Payne. 468 S.E.2d at 340. The Colorado Court of Appeals remanded a 
case involving a conviction for burglary because the prosecutor dismissed six men from 
the jury. Gandy, 878 P.2d at 69. The prosecutor in Gandy explained that he had 
dismissed the men because his "profile for the ideal juror was, like the victim, an 
educated professional woman who resided in the same neighborhood and in a similar 
living situation/' IdL at 70. The Court was dissatisfied with this answer, and remanded for 
further findings and rulings on the issue of gender discrimination. Id 
Here, the prosecutor's blatantly discriminatory explanation did not meet the 
second part of the three-part test. The prosecutor, apparently attempting to justify his 
reasoning, indicated that "this Jury would be better able to deliberate the evidence that I 
anticipate presenting to it if it were balanced between men and women." R. 101 [27]. 
21 
However, the record shows that the prosecutor was not attempting to achieve an equal 
balance of men and women on the jury. Although the first seventeen venirepersons 
included ten men and seven women, the impaneled jury consisted of five women and 
only three men. R. 49. The percentage of men was reduced from fifty-nine percent of the 
first seventeen venirepersons to thirty-seven percent on the jury because of the 
prosecutor's plan to deliberately remove as many men as possible from the jury. R. 49, 
101 [27]. During the peremptory challenge exercise the defense counsel had also 
eliminated some men, and if the prosecutor had intended to achieve an equal balance of 
men and women he would have stopped eliminating men once the number of men and 
women were equal.22 However, the prosecutor undauntedly continued eliminating only 
men. 
Further, achieving an equal balance of men and women on the jury is not a 
legitimate goal. This goal is based upon the archaic and overbroad gender stereotypes 
condemned in J.E.B.. and is inherently discriminatory in its nature. J.E.B.. 511 U.S. at 
130-31. Thus, the prosecutor's comment indicating that he was trying to achieve a 
balance of men and women on the jury is not bourne out in the record and is, itself, an 
The peremptory strikes were exercised as follows: (1) prosecutor eliminated Mr. Paul 
Nicolet, (2) defense counsel eliminated Mr. Kevin Leitch, (3) prosecutor eliminated Mr. Michael 
Zarnofsky, (4) defense counsel eliminated Mr. Robert Cluff, (5) prosecutor eliminated Mr.Mark 
Hanson, (6) defense counsel eliminated Ms. Rebel Wood (Ms. Wood is a woman, R. 101 [8]), 
(7) prosecutor eliminated Mr. Romero, and (8) defense counsel eliminated Mr. David Cornelius. 
R.49. 
22 
illegitimate explanation for Mr. Romero's dismissal 23 
C. The Trial Court's Declaration that the Prosecutor's Blatant Sexual 
Discrimination in a Spouse Abuse Case is not Inappropriate Sets a Dangerous 
Precedent Which Wholly Defies the United States Supreme Court's Ruling in 
J.E.B.. the Holding of this Court and the Holding of the Utah Supreme Court 
Because the prosecutor's explanation was not racially and sexually neutral, the 
trial court should have disallowed the strike immediately instead of proceeding to part 
three of the three-part test.24 Notwithstanding, purposeful racial discrimination was 
proven under the third part of the test. Part three requires the trial court to consider the 
prosecutor's explanation in light of the surrounding circumstances, and decide whether 
there was intentional discrimination. ColwelL 2000 UT 8, f20-24. In State v. Cantu. the 
Utah Supreme Court indicated that: 
the presence of one or more of [the following] factors will tend to show that 
the state's reasons are not actually supported by the record or are an 
impermissible pretext: (1) alleged group bias not shown to be shared by the 
juror in question, (2) failure to examine the juror or perfunctory 
examination, assuming neither the trial court nor opposing counsel had 
questioned the juror, (3) singling the juror out for special questioning 
designed to evoke a certain response, (4) the prosecutor's reason is 
unrelated to the facts of the case, and (5) a challenge based on reasons 
23
 See ColwelL 2000 UT 8,1J22 ("We have previously held that a proponent's reason 
given to justify a peremptory challenge must be (1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, (3) 
clear and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate." (Internal quotations omitted)). 
24
 See Bowman. 945 P.2d at 155 ("If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court 
must then decide (step 3) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial 
discrimination.") (quoting Higginbotham. 917 P.2d at 547). 
23 
equally applicable to juror[s] who were not challenged.25 
Ultimately, the prosecutor's explanation must be "(1) [n]eutral, (2) related to the case 
being tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate." Cantu. 778 P.2d at 518. 
Application of these criteria demonstrate that the prosecutor discriminated against 
Mr. Romero on the basis of his race and gender. In explaining Mr. Romero's dismissal, 
the prosecutor blatantly stated that he dismissed Mr. Romero "because he was a man . . . " 
and implied that Mr. Romero had certain opinions and biases "because he was a man . . . 
." R. 101 [27]. The prosecutor also indicated that he was trying to achieve a balance of 
sexes on the jury, Id, and this is inherently discriminatory because it assigns certain 
opinions, sympathies, and tendencies to people solely on the basis of their gender. 
Further, the prosecutor used 100 percent of his strikes to eliminate men, R. 49, and then 
explained to the court that his general game plan was to remove men from the jury. R. 
101 [27]. 
There is no apparent reason to disbelieve the prosecutor's comments. Such 
comments were against his own interests and were supported by his use of strikes. R. 49. 
The prosecutor does not appear to have been kidding. R. 101 [27]. Further, the court did 
not appear to disbelieve the comments, and in fact, acknowledged them and indicated 
that it did not think that the prosecutor's game plan was inappropriate. R. 101 [28]. 
There is also a showing of racial discrimination which the court failed to examine 
25
 Cantu. 778 P.2d at 518-19. See also State v. Span. 819 P.2d 329, 342-43 (Utah 1991); 
Bowman. 945 P.2d at 155-56; Pharos, 846 P.2d at 463-64. 
24 
properly, and which was the original motivation for the challenge. As the United States 
Supreme Court explained in J.E.B.: 
Because gender and race are overlapping categories, gender can be used as 
a pretext for racial discrimination. Allowing parties to remove racial 
minorities from the jury not because of their race, but because of their 
gender, contravenes well-established equal protection principles and could 
insulate effectively racial discrimination from judicial scrutiny. 
J.E.EL 511 U.S. at 145. After the prosecutor tendered his sexually discriminatory 
explanation, the trial court should have inquired further to determine whether the 
prosecutor was using gender as a pretext for racial discrimination. However, the court did 
not do this. The court did not ask the prosecutor why Mr. Romero was dismissed instead 
of a different man.26 The court did not conduct further voir dire with Mr. Romero. R. 101 
[27-28], The court did not even ask the prosecutor for further explanation.27 The entire 
challenge, explanation, and ruling took only three pages, R. 101 [25-28], and resulted in 
scant enlightenment beyond the prosecutor's indication that he was systematically 
removing men from the venire. R. 101 [27]. In light of the fact that Mr. Romero was the 
26
 R. 101 [27-28]. Instead of dismissing Mr. Romero, the prosecutor could have 
dismissed Brian Smith, Matthew Gregory, Robert Bennett, or David Cornelius. R. 49. 
27
 Id. The only question which the court asked was as follows: 
THE COURT: So, the striking - - your peremptory challenge to Mr. Romero had nothing 
- - according to your statement here, had nothing at all to do to the fact that he has an 
Hispanic surname? 
MR. COPE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
Id at 27. 
25 
sole minority venireperson, the fact that nothing during voir dire indicated that Mr. 
Romero was an incompetent or undesirable venireperson, and the prosecutor's sexually 
discriminatory explanation, the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous.28 
Finally, the trial court's ruling that gender discrimination is not inappropriate in a 
"spousal-abuse type of case," R. 101 [28], directly defies the holding of J.E.B. and its 
jurisprudence. Under the trial court's precedent, prosecutors could unabashedly 
discriminate on the basis of gender in any case simply by expressing the belief that one 
gender as a group is more likely to be sympathetic to prosecutorial arguments. This raises 
the specter of social injustice condemned in J.E.B.. which chronicled the exclusion of 
women from jury service, property ownership, voting, and serving as legal guardians of 
their own children from the time of English common law. J.E.B. 511 U.S. at 131-34. It 
also "ratifies] and reinforc[es] prejudicial views of the relative abilities of men and 
women," IdL at 140, which are often "'archaic and overbroad '" Id. at 135 (citation 
omitted). There is "virtually no support for the conclusion that gender alone is an 
accurate predictor of juror's attitudes," Id at 139, and "[sjtriking individual jurors on the 
assumption that they hold particular views simply because of their gender is 'practically a 
brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority.'" Id. at 142 (citation 
omitted). The unconstitutional precedent set by the trial court should be unhesitatingly 
28
 There is no evidence to marshal in support of the trial court's determination of no 
racial or gender-based discrimination. See ColwelL 2000 UT 8, [^20 ("To show clear error, the 
appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's finding and then 
demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient to support the findings against an attack.") (quoting Higginbotham. 917 P.2d at 548). 
26 
quashed by this Court and replaced by a condemnation of gender discrimination during 
jury selection. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, Mr. Chatwin's conviction should be reversed, and this case 
should be remanded for a new trial before a jury which court and counsel chose without 
resorting to unconstitutional race or gender discrimination. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this I6U day of January, 2002. 
Sfc&c/xJ 
LEATHER JOHNSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISAJ.REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFERY RAY CHATWIN, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 001910582 FS 
J u d g e : J . DENNIS FREDERICK 
D a t e : J a n u a r y 5 , 2 001 
6.0.*Hl$\H ENTERS 
PRESENT 
C l e r k : c i n d y b DATE 
P r o s e c u t o r : BERNARDS-GOODMAN, KATHERINE 
D e f e n d a n t 
Defendant's Attorney (s) : OCONNELL, JOHN D JR 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: August 4, 1964 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 10:27-10:36 
CHARGES 
1 . AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 3 rd Degree Fe lony 
P l e a : G u i l t y - D i s p o s i t i o n : 11 /21 /2000 { G u i l t y P l e a } 
SENTENCE PRISON 
B a s e d on t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3 rd 
D e g r e e F e l o n y , t h e d e f e n d a n t i s s e n t e n c e d t o an i n d e t e r m i n a t e t e rm 
of n o t t o exceed f i v e y e a r s i n t h e Utah S t a t e P r i s o n . 
The p r i s o n t e rm i s s u s p e n d e d . 
Criminal Sentence @J 
Case No: 001910582 
Date: Jan 05, 2001 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: LDA 
Restitution: 
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE 
Pay restitution of all medical expenses of victim. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 1 year(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Not to obtain any prescriptions without prior knowledge of 
probation officer. 
*Serve 60 days in the Salt Lake County Jail (ADC) in addition to 
the time already served. 
Upon release from jail, enter into and successfully complete 
counseling program through F.A.C.T. or the Center for Family 
Development as recommended by Adult Probcition and Parole. 
No contact with victim Brenda Lee. 
Case No: 001910582 
Date: Jan 05, 2001 
Obtain and maintain full-time verifiable employment. 
Pay recoupment fee and restitution as ordered within the probation 
term. 
*THE COURT ORDERS DEFENDANT BE COMMITTED FORTHWITH TO THE SALT LAKE 
COUNTY JAIL (ADC) FOR 60 DAYS IN ADDITION TO THE TIME ALREADY 
SERVED, AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION.* 
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THE COURT: You may be seated for a moment, folks. 
Will you please read the Information? 
(Clerk reads Information.) 
THE COURT: Members of the Jury, I will remind you of 
an admonition each time we reconvene or recess. The 
admonition is: Do not discuss this case with anyone. Do not 
allow anyone to discuss it with you or in your presence. If 
anyone attempts to do so, I want you to report it to myself or 
the bailiff immediately. 
You must not view, listen to, read or otherwise be 
exposed to any media report about this trial. I don't 
anticipate there will be any, but you must be cautious about 
that. You must keep an open mind until you have heard all of 
the evidence and not be distracted by any outside influences. 
I will remind you of that admonition at each recess. 
Now, we are going to take a recess, folks, of 
approximately 15 minutes. And we will reconvene when the 
Bailiff tells us itfs time. Thank you, folks. 
(Recess.) 
THE COURT: We are convened in the instant matter 
outside of the presence of the Jury. 
Mr. Cope, Mr. O'Connell, you wanted to say something 
on the record? 
MR. O'CONNELL: Your Honor, I had been concerned 
Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter 
j about one of the Statef s challenges, and I wanted to put that 
i on the record. It was, I think, Number 11, Amador Romero. 
! Mr. Romero was the only minority on the Jury, and I understand 
! 
! 
I my client is not a minority, but I still think that hefs 
entitled to the benefit — my client comes from a lower 
socioeconomic environment, that Mr. Romero does not 
necessarily come from that, but as a minority I think he has 
more sympathy to that type of thing. And so I think he's 
still entitled to have him on this jury. And I think under 
U.S. v, Battson (phonetic) — I forget the — under the 
Supreme Court challenge, I am raising an objection to him 
taking out the only minority at least in the first 17 we were 
I picking from. He was the only minority and was taken off by 
the State. 
THE COURT: Mr. Cope, do you wish to state for the 
record your rationale for exercising that peremptory thatf s 
being referred to? 
MR. COPE: Your Honor, under Battson (phonetic) , my 
understanding is that unless the Court finds that there was 
some improper motivation or prima facia case was establish by 
the Defense for that, that I will not have to state a reason 
for striking Mr. Romero. If the Court finds that Mr. Romero 
was a minority, I believe — I guess the Court could find 
| that. 
But I note tha t Mr. Romero was the fourth person 
Carl ton Way, Regis tered Profess ional Reporter 
taken by the prosecution, and that — well, if the Court wants 
me to state my reason for taking him rather than — 
THE COURT: Let me say it this way: Of the initial 
17 names from which the Jury was selected, at least as our 
procedure goes, it appears to me that the name "Romero" is, 
indeed, a Hispanic surname, and I think that given that fact, 
alone, Counsel's probably entitled to some explanation as to 
your reasons so I may then determine whether or not, in my 
estimation, it was neutral and not racially charged so to 
speak. 
MR. COPE: I felt, Your Honor, that this Jury would 
be better able to deliberate the evidence that I anticipate 
presenting to it if it were balanced between men and woman. I 
therefore made efforts to take men off of the Jury- That may 
not make a great deal of sense, but that was the game plan. 
Mr. Romero was a man, I took him because he was a man and I 
thought I would be more comfortable with Ms. Rayburn or 
Ms. Tapp on the Jury than Mr. Romero on the Jury. 
THE COURT: So, the striking — your peremptory 
challenge to Mr. Romero had nothing — according to your 
statement here, had nothing at all to do to the fact that he 
has an Hispanic surname? 
MR. COPE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Very w e l l . 
MR. O'CONNELL: Your Honor, i n response t o t h a t : 
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Briefly, I think Mr. Romero also had a little bit of an accent 
as I recall — 
THE COURT: Excuse me? 
MR. O'CONNELL: Had a little bit of an accent, which 
probably won't show up in the record since this is 
transcribed. 
My concern, of course, is — I can't remember the 
name of the case. There was a later Supreme Court case that 
extended Battson to gender as well, and it is also 
inappropriate for the State to remove somebody solely based 
upon their gender. And taking people off because they are 
male or female I think is also inappropriate and in the same 
situation as taking off a minority. So I think either way 
that it is an inappropriate choice. 
THE COURT: Well, I am not prepared to state that the 
challenge was inappropriate. It appears to me that there's 
been a justification for exercising the challenge against 
Mr. Romero. And moreover I' m not persuaded that in a case of 
this nature, specifically a spousal-abuse type of case, that 
selecting jurors, be they male or female which the Prosecutor 
or Defense for that matter decides might be more inclined to 
adhere to the Prosecution' s theory of the case or the 
Defense's theory, for instance, that that was an inappropriate 
way or manner or justification for a challenge; therefore, 
your challenge is declined. 
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Letf s bring the Jury in. 
(Jury Present.). 
THE COURT: Jury is present, Counsel and the 
Defendant are present. 
You may present your opening statement, Mr. Cope. 
MR. COPE: Thank you. 
Mr. Chatwin, Mr. O'Connell, Your Honor, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, this is a very simple case. It has a simple 
chronology. It has a simple cast of witnesses. There won't 
be a great deal of doubt about what happened by the time the 
evidence is finished. 
The significance of what happened is what you are to 
determine. The Defendant sits there today protected by the 
shroud or mantel of innocence that we all have as citizens, 
especially when the sovereign state says: "You did something 
that's against the criminal law and we intend to try you for 
it." 
This all begins on the 13th of June; late in the 
evening; certainly after 10:00 o1clock but before 11:00 
o!clock. 
The Defendant, Mr. Chatwin, and his girlfriend — I 
think that's an appropriate term for her — had not been 
getting along. She decided that she wanted to leave the 
residence that they were sharing. That place is at 1225 West 
Indiana Avenue. Anybody who knows Salt Lake City knows that 
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